Glenda B. Claborne
Socio 500b
March 9, 1999
Take what Chomsky, Pinker and Bickerton are saying and discuss how you would begin to speculate about the origin of the self and the notion of self-reflexivity. If what they are saying is right, then how would the self emerge?
Although Chomsky, Pinker, and Bickerton all stated explicitly that the theory of an innate language faculty/instinct/capacity does not have a direct bearing on morality and ethics, which are important for any social theory of action, what they are saying do have direct implications on theories of learning and the function of language in society. (1) We have already discussed in class the argument that, if the theory of a language instinct is true, then any theory of human behavior and society can no longer assume the mind as a blank slate that can be filled and molded solely by conditioned or experiential learning. (2) As to the function of language in society, we can derive the argument that, if meaning does not necessarily come out of the ways people use words, then the notion of communication as the primary and most important function of language in society must be rethought.
The first argument raises questions about how human nature should be viewed and whether social theories must be built explicitly on what constitutes human behavior. Chomsky, most emphatically, argues that any science dealing with human behavior and societies cannot do otherwise but begin with the nature of its object of study (humans). Otherwise, it has nothing to say but meaningless data. Chomsky attributes the explanatory power and scope of Adam Smith's and Karl Marx's theories on the fact that these were based on ideas about human nature. Joas' theory of the creativity of social action suggests that the failure of Marx's theory is not so much that his ideas were wrong but that his theories did not take into account the wholeness or unity of human nature.
What then constitutes the wholeness or unity of human nature? Bergesen (lecture and notes) suggests a unity of body, mind, and spirit and furthermore, a unity with the natural environment. How can this be accomplished? There is now a trend to forward theories putting together the various elements of what constitutes a whole in seamless continua rather than in broken stages. The only step forward, it seems, is toward new forms of universalism and globology. However, the old dilemmas concerning the reality of differences, real or imagined, and the necessity of interdependence and common standards still pose big problems for any formulation of new social theories. Over the last half of this century, the solutions to the dilemma between autonomy and interdependence, whether it was between individuals, groups or states, have been tried through dialogue and discourse. Ironically, however, the language of dialogue and discourse has taken on forms that are too abstract to be at all meaningful to the real lives of the people concerned. We achieved intricate abstract symbols but the concrete problems of everyday life remain. This tells me that the difficulty in overcoming the dilemma between autonomy and interdependence suggests a deeper question of what/who should be the locus of control in any action toward social order and/or social change.
What the theory of the innate capacities of the mind suggests is that the locus of control should be the individual. It seems to give teeth to Kant's universal unconditionals and before him, to Descartes' principle of autonomy from authority. However, as Chomsky, Pinker and Bickerton candidly admit, the cognitive structures of the mind, however wonderfully rational and creative they can be, cannot and may not ever explain that consciousness of being upon which the most sublime of human accomplishments were achieved.
For sociology to try to explain consciousness of being to find a basis for just and moral social actions, it would have to face the choice of dissolving away its object of inquiry or of declaring sociology null and void. This is the choice that Paul Tillich faced when he tried to bridge the distinction between faith and reason through a deeper understanding of the dichotomy through a philosophy of religion. As soon as a philosophy or a sociology of religion comes nearer to its real object of study, which is largely knowledge through revelation, it loses its distinction as a discipline and becomes a theology. It cannot but go that way. If one tries to study consciousness through Eastern religions which in recent decades have increasingly claimed to be truly scientific and rational by virtue of their nontheistic orientation, one has only to clarify the semantic use of theistic concepts to find out that both in abstract forms and in practice, Eastern mysticism is loaded with its own notions of the divine. A resort to Eastern beliefs in the cyclical nature of matter and energy as proof of its compatibility with the natural sciences may have its merits but the impersonality of the divine and the human in Eastern religions nullifies any notion of any real personality or self-hood of any living being. The same goes for theories of the emergence of self out of the framework of biological evolution. That is, if we have to define personality, being, self-consciousness, etc. as having to arise out of personal sources. If we accept that our personality and all the things that we think make us human such as pain, love, purpose, etc. can be derived from impersonal forces as molecules and atoms gaining form and significance over long periods of time and space, then our problems may be just matters of semantic conundrums that can be resolved by a certain use of language.